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Abstract: Research provides evidence that the method chosen to elicit value has an important effect on a 
person’s valuation. We hypothesize that role has a crucial effect on decision makers’ elicited values: 
Buyers prefer to pay less and sellers prefer to collect more. We conduct experimental sessions and 
replicate the disparity between willingness to pay and willingness to accept. We conduct additional 
sessions in which role is stripped away: Endowed decision makers provide values that are used to 
determine a price at which anonymous others transact. Importantly, decision makers’ earnings in the 
experiment are not affected by the elicited values, but the endowments influence decision makers’ 
valuations. Our findings suggest that decision makers consider their relative standing, in comparison to 
anonymous others, in providing valuations. The disparity between willingness to pay and willingness to 
accept disappears when decision makers’ endowments ensure that they are at least as well off as other 
participants. 
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Economic theory suggests that there should be little disparity between an individual’s 
maximum willingness to pay (WTP) to acquire a good and the minimum compensation to 
relinquish the good (WTA), when income effects are small.  Yet, research over the last 30 years 
has shown that the method chosen to elicit monetary value has a significant effect on a person’s 
valuation.  The results of many experiments suggest that WTA far exceeds WTP and income 
effects cannot explain the gap.  The disparity in valuations, if in fact one exists, has important 
implications for environmental policy, markets, and the allocation of rights. 
In their review of the extensive literature, Horowitz and McConnell (2002) provide 
insight into the economic importance of valuation disparities.  According to their estimates, 
WTA is approximately seven times higher than WTP.  This suggests that the general public 
would preserve seven times more land already owned than would be preserved if the land had to 
be purchased from landowners.   Furthermore, because the appropriate measure of valuation is 
unclear, so is the best measure of welfare.  In the market domain, if WTA and WTP diverge, it is 
difficult to predict volume and the gains that result from trade.  Legal scholarship recognizes the 
importance of valuation differentials on legal entitlements and corporate relationships (e.g., 
Arlen, Spitzer, and Talley (2001)). 
The cause of the difference in valuation, if it exists, remains unresolved because of 
procedural choices made by experimental researchers (Davis and Holt (1993)).  Many arguments 
have been proposed to explain the disparity between WTA and WTP.
1  For example, the 
                                                 
1 In a related literature, the value of gift giving is disputed.  Some argue that gift-giving results in a deadweight loss.  
For example, Waldfogel (1993) concludes that gift recipients value their gifts at 87 percent of their cost.  However, 
Solnick and Hemenway (1996) estimate that there is a 214 percent welfare gain so that recipients actually valued   2 
disparity may increase for goods that lack close substitutes because it is more difficult to 
compensate for the loss of a unique good (Hanemann (1991)).  However, recent experimental 
results suggest that the disparity persists for a wide variety of goods, even those with close 
substitutes (Horowitz and McConnell (2002)). 
Another theoretical explanation from the psychology literature attributes the disparity 
between WTA and WTP to an endowment effect:  ownership itself makes a good more valuable 
so that WTA exceeds WTP (Thaler (1980) and Thaler and Johnson (1990)).  According to this 
explanation, objects that are owned are valued more because people are subject to loss aversion 
and a person who is loss averse suffers more from a loss than benefits from a gain of equal 
magnitude (Kahneman and Tversky (1979)). 
The importance of an endowment effect has been widely accepted in the literature and 
introduced into economics and finance models as a feature of preferences.
2  Recently, Plott and 
Zeiler (2005) question whether the gap between WTA and WTP can be attributed to an 
endowment effect.  They argue that procedural choices are critical in order to control subject 
misconceptions.  With no unified theory of misconceptions, experimenters have implemented a 
variety of procedures and controls.  When an incentive compatible elicitation mechanism is used 
and participants receive training and are paid for practice with anonymity, Plott and Zeiler 
conclude that WTA is not significantly higher than WTP.   
An important feature of Plott and Zeiler’s paper is their use of procedural choices to 
effectively strip away strategic considerations, thereby suppressing the effect of role: being a 
buyer or seller.  The authors point out that procedural choices may have caused participants to 
perceive that the experimenter wanted to remove any special value of ownership.  Others 
                                                                                                                                                             
gifts at more than their cost.  Ruffle and Tykocinski (2000) provide insight into the different results and conclude 
that how you ask the question is critical.   
2 For example, Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) imbed the endowment effect in their model of asset pricing.   3 
recognize the importance of the evaluator’s point of view (e.g., Marshall, Knetsch, and Sinden 
(1986) and Van Boven, Dunning, and Loewenstein (2000, 2003)).  Eliciting WTA puts 
participants in the role of a seller, whereas measuring WTP puts them in the role of a buyer.  The 
assigned role creates a perspective from which valuations are based: sellers want to collect more 
and buyers want to pay less.   
Without question, individuals have difficulty setting aside their perspective and fully 
comprehending another’s point of view.  As the old adage goes, it is difficult to walk in someone 
else’s shoes.  Van Boven, Dunning, and Loewenstein (2000) conduct experiments in which mug 
owners estimate buyers’ average purchase price and mug buyers estimate owners’ average 
selling price.  They find that owners overestimate buyers’ average purchase price and buyers 
underestimate owners’ selling price.  Van Boven, Dunning, and Loewenstein maintain that 
sellers and buyers underestimate the size of the endowment effect because they are subject to 
egocentric empathy gaps.  People overestimate the similarity between their valuation and the 
valuation of someone in another role.  Participants’ role is so critical to valuation that it can 
affect behavior even more than direct monetary incentives.
3 
Some research has examined the assessments of participants acting on behalf of others.  
Marshall, Knetsch, and Sinden (1986) conclude that when individuals evaluate entitlements for 
others, the disparity between WTP and WTA is much smaller.
4  In their experiments, participants 
were asked to make decisions on behalf of a third person.  An advisor evaluated whether another 
should pay a fixed amount for a lottery ticket (WTP) or accept a fixed sum (WTA).  Marshall, 
Knetsch, and Sinden find that advisors’ decisions differed significantly from those of participants 
                                                 
3 For example, Moore, Loewenstein, Tanlu, and Bazerman (2004) show that ties to a partisan (an accountability 
relationship) influence individuals’ beliefs more than monetary payments.   
4 Our experiment differs from Marshall, Knetsch, and Sinden’s in that we use an incentive compatible elicitation 
mechanism and vary the endowment of the decision maker.  Marshall, Knetsch, and Sinden’s decision makers were 
not compensated.   4 
who answered on their own behalf.  When advisors made decisions, there was no evidence of a 
gap between WTP and WTA.  Notably though, the study did not elicit values, rather decisions 
were provided about buying or selling entitlements. 
In another study, Van Boven, Loewenstein, and Dunning (2003) had participants act as 
buyers’ agents.  Agents’ earnings were contingent on their ability to estimate owner’s selling 
prices.  Van Boven, Loewenstein, and Dunning report that agents’ offers were too low: buyers’ 
agents underestimated the owner’s selling price. 
We experimentally investigate the effect of role on individuals’ valuations and whether 
participants can provide objective valuations for others.  In a series of experimental sessions, we 
endow participants with a good and cash and ask for their valuation (WTA).  In another series we 
endow them with cash and ask how much they are willing to pay for the good (WTP).  The good 
is actually transacted in every session.  We use coffee mugs because they are highly substitutable 
and a disparity in WTP and WTA with mugs has been extensively documented (Kahneman, 
Knetsch, Thaler (1990)).  Furthermore, we provide participants with a cash endowment because 
Morrison (1997) argues that compensated WTP is required for valid comparison (giving those in 
the WTP an amount of cash that would put them on the same indifference curve).  To obtain 
market values, we use a demand revealing mechanism that allows for learning.  We use an n-th 
price or Vickrey auction, which theoretically provides incentives to reveal true valuations 
(Vickrey (1961)).
5  In addition, we use repeated participation because experimental research has 
shown that despite the dominance of a strategy of true revelation, participants do not initially 
reveal true values (Coursey, Hovis, and Schulze (1987) and Davis and Holt (1993)). 
                                                 
5 Plott and Zeiler (2005) argue that the elicitation mechanism proposed by Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak (1964) is 
the most incentive compatible, with the Vickrey auction as the next best, in theory.  Although strategic 
considerations may be introduced in an environment such as the Vickrey auction, these considerations are relevant 
in real markets.  In addition, our primary contribution results from markets in which participants are asked to 
provide valuations for others.  In this situation, strategic considerations are minimized.   5 
We replicate earlier experiments and document a sizable disparity between WTP and 
WTA when participants provide valuations on their own behalf.  As reported in many other 
studies, participants require more to relinquish a good than they offer to acquire it.  To strip away 
the effect of role, we conduct sessions in which decision makers (denoted DMs) provide 
valuations that affect others: the valuations determine a price at which others (adherents) buy or 
sell a mug.  Unlike Van Boven, Loewenstein, and Dunning (2003), the DMs’ elicited values do 
not affect their final wealth: they are endowed at the beginning of a session and the endowment 
is theirs to keep, representing experimental earnings. 
Initially we endow the DM with a mug and cash ($10).  We find a strikingly different 
relationship between WTA and WTP than in the earlier sessions: WTA is significantly less than 
WTP.  This result caused us to consider the standing (experimental earnings) of the DM relative 
to that of the adherent.  Could it be that participants’ relative standing affects their valuations?  
We conduct additional sessions and endow the DM with only cash ($20).  We find that the 
disparity between WTA and WTP is eliminated and, in turn, conclude that the endowment 
provides a referent to consider relative payoffs.  Because the numeraire has a known value and is 
fungible, it is the natural referent.  When DMs are only endowed with cash, they are at least as 
well off as the adherents – in terms of what is taken away from the experiment.  Under such 
conditions, they are able to provide objective valuations.  As discussed later, when the DMs are 
endowed with a mug and cash ($10), relative standing may color their valuations, causing WTA 
to be less than WTP 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The experimental design, discussed 
subsequently, is summarized in Table I.  Sections I, II, and III detail the experimental method 
and results for each treatment.  Section IV contains a discussion and concluding remarks.   6 
 
I. The Base Treatment 
We conduct six sessions in the base treatment, each with eight participants.  Each session 
consists of a series of ten trials and requires approximately 30 minutes.  Participants’ are students 
at a medium-sized university located in the Southeastern U.S. and all are inexperienced in that no 
one took part in more than one session.
6  At the beginning of each session, participants receive a 
set of instructions and follow along as an experimenter reads aloud.
7   
A. Experimental Procedures 
In the first treatment we attempt to replicate the reported disparity between WTP and 
WTA to provide a basis of comparison.  We measure first willingness to accept in sessions 1-3, 
referred to as the Base/WTA sessions.  Student participants are given $10 in cash and a coffee 
mug bearing the university’s emblem that sells at the bookstore for $7.00.
8  The written 
instructions are as follows: 
Each participant in the experiment just received $10 in cash and a mug.  These are 
yours to keep.  During the experiment you will submit offers indicating the 
amount of money you will accept in exchange for the mug.  We will refer to this 
amount of money as your “offer.”   
 
You will record your offer on the card provided with these instructions.  After 
recording your offer, please turn your card face down (with your offer facing 
down and your participant number on top).  An experimenter will circulate around 
the room to collect the cards.  Once you record your offer, you cannot revise it 
and you may be required to exchange your mug for cash. 
 
The instructions then describe the Vickrey auction used to elicit WTA with repeated 
participation as follows: 
After all participants have recorded their offers on the recording cards, the 
experimenters will collect the cards.  We will rank all participants’ offers from 
                                                 
6 This holds for all sessions (i.e., across all experimental treatments). 
7 The complete instructions are available upon request. 
8 The fact that the mug can be purchased at the bookstore for $7.00 is not disclosed to participants at any time.   7 
highest to lowest.  Those with the four lowest offers may be required to exchange 
their mug with the experimenters at the fifth lowest offer.  If you are required to 
exchange your mug for money, you will always receive at least your offer.  Any 
ties in offers will be resolved randomly. 
 
We will repeat these steps 10 times.  At the end of each trial, the offer price at 
which transactions may occur is announced (i.e., the fifth lowest offer).  However, 
only one of the ten trials will be binding.  A number from one to ten will be 
randomly selected to determine the binding trial. 
 
Are there any questions? 
 
You now own the mug and $10 in your possession.  Please indicate the amount 
that you are willing to accept in exchange for the mug. 
 
As the instructions indicate, participants are told at the outset that they will be paid based on the 
results of only one of the trials, and this trial is chosen by a card draw.  Because ex ante the 
students have no way of knowing which trial is the payout trial it is in their interest to treat all 
trials equally seriously. 
  Sessions 4-6 are conducted similarly except that participants are endowed with $20 and 
asked to indicate the amount they are willing to pay to acquire a mug (Base/WTP).  The 
instructions are as follows: 
Each participant in the experiment just received $20 in cash.  This cash is yours to keep.  
The experimenter has in her/his possession 4 mugs.  You are free to examine the mugs.  
During the experiment you will submit offers indicating the amount of money you would 
pay in exchange for a mug.  We will refer to this amount of money as your “offer.” 
 
The instructions continue and describe the Vickrey auction as follows: 
After all participants have recorded their offers on the recording cards, the experimenters 
will collect the cards.  We will rank all participants’ offers from highest to lowest.  Those 
with the four highest offers may be required to exchange cash for a mug with the 
experimenters at the fifth highest offer.  Thus, if you are required to exchange money for 
a mug, you will never pay more than your offer.  Any ties in offers will be resolved 
randomly. 
 
Again the procedures are repeated over ten trials and one randomly selected trial determines the 
binding outcome.   8 
 
B. The Results 
Table II reports measures of WTA and WTP using the Vickrey auction.  Panel A reports 
the average price and median offer across trials and sessions for the Base treatment.  The price in 
the WTA (WTP) sessions is the fifth (highest) lowest offer.  The table reports the average WTA 
and WTP for all 10 trials, as well as trials 1-5 and 6-10 for each treatment.  Below the value 
measurements are z -statistics and corresponding p-values, the result of Mann-Whitney tests of 
the null hypothesis that WTA and WTP do not differ.
9   
For the Base treatment, WTA exceeds WTP for prices and offers, at high significance 
levels (p < 0.0001).  Inferences are unchanged if the tests use data for all trials, trials 1-5, or trials 
6-10.  We also estimated a repeated-measures ANOVA to compare prices across sessions and 
find that method of elicitation (WTP versus WTA) is statistically significant (F1,4 = 7.71, p = 
0.05).
10  Although not reported, results are unaffected when the repeated-measures ANOVA uses 
participants’ offers as the dependent measure. 
 
II. The Decision Maker Treatment: Mug Endowment 
  The results of our Base treatment are consistent with the w idely reported disparity 
between WTP and WTA.  As argued by others (e.g., Marshall, Knetsch, and Sinden (1986) and 
Van Boven, Dunning, and Loewenstein (2000, 2003)), the evaluator’s viewpoint is important to 
the elicited valuation.  In order to separate the effect of role, we ask decision makers (DMs) to 
                                                 
9 Inferences are unchanged with Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for all Mann-Whitney tests reported here and 
subsequently in this paper. 
10 Period and the interaction of period and method of elicitation are not significant in any of the repeated measures 
ANOVAs (p > 0.10) reported in the paper.  In determining statistical significance, the degrees of freedom for within-
subject effects are adjusted using the Greenhouse-Geisser procedure.  The adjustment is necessary because, in each 
case, Mauchly's test of sphericity is rejected at p < 0.01.   9 
provide valuations for others in the second treatment.  The DMs are endowed with a mug and 
$10, which they take from the experiment as their compensation.  We refer to this as the 
DM/Mug treatment. 
 
A. Experimental Procedures 
  In sessions 7 -12 we again elicit measures of WTA and WTP.  The process differs, 
however, in that participants (the DMs) are asked to indicate valuations for other students (the 
adherents).  Twelve inexperienced students are recruited for each session and randomly divided 
into groups of 8 and 4.  The two groups meet in separate rooms and do not see each other until 
the conclusion of the experimental session.   
In sessions 7-9, all twelve participants are given $10 in cash and a coffee mug bearing the 
university’s emblem that sells at the bookstore for $7.00 (DM/Mug/WTA).  The endowment is 
common knowledge to all twelve participants.  In these sessions, the DMs provide values that 
determine a price at which the adherents will sell their mug.  The group of eight DMs is directed 
as follows: 
Each participant in this room just received $10 in cash and a mug.  In addition, 
four participants in another room also have received $10 in cash and a mug.   
 
During the experiment you will submit offers indicating the amount of money that 
participants in the other room will accept in exchange for their mug.  We will 
refer to this amount of money as your “offer.” 
 
You will record your offer on the card provided with these instructions.  After 
recording your offer, please turn your card face down (with your offer facing 
down and your participant number on top).  An experimenter will circulate around 
the room to collect the cards.  Once you record your offer, you cannot revise it, 
and it may represent the amount that participants in the other room are required to 
exchange their mugs for cash. 
   10 
As in the Base/WTA treatment (sessions 1-3), the instructions then describe the Vickrey auction: 
the fifth lowest offer determines the market valuation.  But in this case, the market valuation is 
the amount that others may be required to accept in exchange for their mugs.  Again, one of the 
10 trials is randomly selected as the binding trial and the fifth lowest offer determines the market 
valuation.  The instructions continue as follows: 
At the conclusion of the experiment, participants in the other  room will be 
brought into this room and the binding trial will be determined.  Participants from 
the other room will then exchange their mugs for cash. 
 
Sessions 10-12 are similar in that the eight DMs are endowed with a mug and $10.  
Unlike sessions 7-9, the four adherents are endowed with $20.  The eight randomly selected 
DMs indicate the amount that participants in the other room should pay to acquire a mug 
(DM/Mug/WTP).  The eight DMs are instructed as follows: 
Each participant in this room just received $10 in cash and a mug.  These are 
yours to keep.  In addition, four participants in another room have received $20 in 
cash.  Participants in the other room will exchange cash for a mug with the 
experimenters at an amount determined by you.  The mug they will receive is 
identical to the mug you received. 
 
During the experiment you will submit offers indicating the amount of money that 
participants in the other room will pay to acquire a mug.  We will refer to this 
amount of money as your “offer.” 
 
You will record your offer on the card provided with these instructions.  After 
recording your offer, please turn your card face down (with your offer facing 
down and your participant number on top).  An experimenter will circulate around 
the room to collect the cards.  Once you record your offer, you cannot revise it, 
and it may represent the amount of cash that participants in the other room are 
required to exchange for a mug. 
 
The i nstructions then describe the Vickrey auction with repeated participation.  The 
procedures are repeated ten times.  The instructions end with the following: 
At the conclusion of the experiment, participants in the other  room will be 
brought into this room and the binding trial will be determined.  Participants from 
the other room will then exchange cash for a mug.   11 
 
The four adherents in the other room are informed that they are bound by the DMs’ 
offers. 
B. The Results 
Panel B of Table II reports measures of WTA and WTP using the Vickrey auction for the 
DM/Mug treatment.  The table reports the average WTA and WTP for all 10 trials, as well as 
trials 1 -5 and 6 -10 for each treatment.  Below the value measurements are z -statistics and 
corresponding p-values, the result of Mann-Whitney tests of the null hypothesis that WTA and 
WTP do not differ.   
Unlike the Base treatment, for the DM/Mug treatment, the relationship between WTP and 
WTA is reversed and WTP exceeds WTA, again at high levels of significance (p < 0.0001).  
Inferences are unchanged if the tests use data for all trials, trials 1-5, or trials 6-10.   A repeated-
measures ANOVA comparing prices across WTA and WTP sessions indicates that the method of 
elicitation is statistically significant (F1,4  = 23.02, p = 0.009).  In contrast to the often-reported 
finding that WTA exceeds WTP, valuations of the DMs in our second treatment lead to a 
significantly higher purchase price than selling price for adherents. 
 
III. The Decision Maker Treatment: Cash Endowment 
  When decision makers are endowed with a mug and $10 in cash, the results are puzzling.  
With WTP higher than WTA, the DMs’ valuations are quite different than those of agents 
providing valuations for themselves.  After reflecting, we wondered if the DMs’ endowment 
affected their valuations.  Because cash is fungible and a natural referent, we conducted six 
additional sessions in which the DMs were endowed with $20.  We refer to this as the DM/Cash 
treatment.   12 
 
A. Experimental Procedures 
We conduct six sessions in the DM/Cash treatment (sessions 13-18) in which we elicit 
measures of WTA and WTP using valuations for other students.  The procedures differ from the 
second treatment in that the DMs are all endowed with $20.  For WTA (sessions 13-15), the four 
adherents are each given $10 in cash and a coffee mug.  The DMs indicate the amount that 
participants in the other room should accept in exchange for their mugs (DM/Cash/WTA).  The 
instructions are as follows: 
Each participant in this room just received $20 in cash.  This cash is yours to keep.  In 
addition, four participants in another room have received $10 in cash and a mug.  The 
experimenter has an identical mug in her/his possession.  You are free to examine the 
mug.  Participants in the other room will exchange their mugs with the experimenters at 
an amount determined by you. 
 
The instructions continue as before (i.e., as in the DM/Mug/WTA sessions). 
For WTP (sessions 16-18), the procedures are similar except that the four adherents are 
endowed with $20 (as are the eight DMs).  The DMs indicate the amount that participants in the 
other room should pay to acquire a mug (DM/Cash/WTP).  The instructions begin as follows: 
Each participant in this room just received $20 in cash.  This cash is yours to keep.  In 
addition, four participants in another room also have received $20 in cash.  The 
experimenter has in her/his possession 4 mugs.  You are free to examine the mugs.  
Participants in the other room will exchange cash for a mug with the experimenters at an 
amount determined by you. 
 
Again, the instructions continue as before (i.e., as in the DM/Mug/WTP sessions). 
 
B. The Results 
Panel C of Table II reports measures of WTA and WTP  for the final treatment 
(DM/Cash), in which DMs are endowed only with cash.  Unlike the first two treatments, the   13 
valuation gap disappears.  Inferences are unchanged if tests use prices or offers for all trials, 
trials 1-5, or trials 6-10. Also unlike the first two treatments, a repeated-measures ANOVA 
comparing prices across WTA and WTP sessions indicates that the method of elicitation is not 
statistically significant (F1,4  = 0.01, p = 0.935). 
 
IV. Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
The literature has documented the impact of elicitation method on individuals’ 
valuations.  This paper demonstrates the importance of role.
11  Commonly, WTA is elicited by 
putting the experimental participant in the role of the seller and WTP by putting the participant in 
the role of buyer.  In our experiment, we first replicate the often-reported result that s ellers 
demand more to surrender a good than buyers are willing to pay to acquire the same good (Base 
treatment).  Next we ask participants to act as decision makers (DMs) who provide valuations for 
others, referred to as the adherents (DM/Mug treatment).  We endow the DMs with a mug and 
$10 in cash.  We now observe that the relationship between WTA and WTP is reversed.  The 
DMs’ valuations are significantly higher when the adherent purchases the mug than when the 
adherent sells the mug.  The striking change in the gap between WTA and WTP in the DM/Mug 
treatment calls for further investigation. 
Models of economic behavior recognize that some people care about fairness 
(Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and Bolton and Ockenfels 
(2000)) and equity is an important factor in bargaining games (Davis and Holt (1993)).  Fairness 
                                                 
11 Price censoring does not explain the results we report in this paper.  In an experiment that elicits value, problems 
can arise if participants rationally believe the good can be purchased at lower prices outside of the laboratory 
(Harrison, Harstad, and Rutstrom (2004)).  In our post-experiment questionnaire we asked participants how much 
they thought the experimenters paid for the mug.  Although price censoring is potentially a significant 
methodological problem, we have no evidence to suggest that it affected our results.  There is no consistent pattern 
in reported costs to the experimenters across treatments.       14 
can be modeled as an aversion to inequity, measured in relative terms.  Individuals are self-
centered and care about relative standing.  While the identification of the reference group may 
not be simple, in an experiment the reference group is the set of participants (Bolton and 
Ockenfels (2000)).   
In our experiment, it appears that a DM who cares about relative standing does not want 
to be worse off than the adherent.  The effect of the DM’s role contrasts sharply with a seller 
who wants to collect more or a buyer who wants to pay less.  The behavior of the DMs in the 
DM/Mug treatment is consistent with recent economic models of behavior.  For example, Fehr 
and Schmidt (1999) provide a model of inequity aversion in which people care about their 
material payoff relative to the payoffs of others.  In addition, relative standing motivates people’s 
behavior in Bolton and Ockenfels’ (2000) model.  In our experimental setting, the WTP 
valuation may be high because the DMs perceive their relative standing to be below that of the 
mug buyers if the mug buyers pay a low price for the mug.  Recall that the DMs are endowed 
with a mug and $10.  In the WTP treatment, if the adherents pay, on average, $8.55 for a mug 
(refer to Panel B of Table II), they leave the experiment with a mug and, on average, $11.45.  On 
the other hand, if the adherents acquire a mug for a low price, they leave the experiment with 
relatively more than the DMs who have a mug and $10.   
In the DM/Cash treatment, DMs may be more objective because they end up in a better 
position than the adherents, assuming cash is preferred.  Interestingly, WTA and WTP are quite 
close to the actual purchase price of the mugs ($7), an amount that was never disclosed to the 
participants.  Because cash is fungible and its value is clear, it is a natural referent.  With an 
endowment of $20, relative standing is of less concern to the DMs and they can focus on the 
decision to be made.   15 
Our results are consistent with DMs being inequity-averse when their relative standing is 
inferior to that of others.  By comparison, DMs do not appear to be concerned about their 
standing when they are better off relative to others.  In other words, our data are consistent with 
preferences being one sided.  Individuals do not like differences in outcomes, at least when they 
are not doing as well as others. 
  This paper documents the important effect of role on the elicitation of value.  Although 
the disparity between WTA and WTP disappears when DMs are endowed with cash and asked to 
provide valuations for others, we certainly cannot conclude that third party decisions are 
superior.  Because DMs evaluate the effects of a change in position so differently depending on 
their own position, they do not necessarily make welfare enhancing decisions for others.   16 
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This table summarizes the experimental design.  All sessions include 10 trials. 
 
Treatment  Measure 






WTA  1-3  8  Mug + $10 
Base 
WTP  4-6  8  $20 
Treatment 
Measure 










WTA  7-9  12  Mug + $10  Mug + $10 
DM/Mug 
WTP  10-12  12  Mug + $10  $20 
WTA  13-15  12  $20  Mug + $10 
DM/Cash 
WTP  16-18  12  $20  $20  
 
   20 
Table II 
Prices and Offers 
 
The table reports the average price and median offer across trials and sessions in each treatment.  In the WTA 
sessions participants are asked to submit offers indicating the amount of money that should be accepted in exchange 
for a mug and in the WTP sessions participants are asked to indicate the amount that should be paid to acquire a 
mug.  The price in the WTA (WTP) sessions is the fifth (highest) lowest offer.  Each session includes 10 trials.  The 
table also reports the average WTA and WTP in trials 1 -5 and 6 -10 for each treatment.  Below the value 
measurements are z -statistics and corresponding p-values, the result of Mann-Whitney tests of the hypothesis that 
WTA and WTP are equal.  Panels A, B, and C, report prices and offers for the Base, DM/Mug, and DM/Cash 
treatments, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Base Treatment 
All Trials  Trials 1-5  Trials 6-10  Measure 
WTA   WTP  WTA   WTP  WTA   WTP 
8.83  1.34  9.04  1.51  8.61  1.18 






10.09  1.64  10.74  1.89  9.03  1.53 







Panel B: DM/Mug Treatment 
All Trials  Trials 1-5  Trials 6-10  Measure 
WTA   WTP  WTA   WTP  WTA   WTP 
3.79  8.55  4.00  8.00  3.57  9.10 






3.71  8.91  3.94  8.31  3.63  9.24 







Panel C: DM/CashTreatment 
All Trials  Trials 1-5  Trials 6-10  Measure 
WTA   WTP  WTA   WTP  WTA   WTP 
6.99  6.92  7.06  6.45  6.92  7.38 






7.53  6.72  6.73  6.74  8.26  6.89 





(0.189)   21 
 